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abstract:
Assets of banks located in France are mainly denominated in euro and in US dollar.
Currency diversification, which measures how much of assets are denominated in US
dollar, implies a credit risk diversification and a valuation effect on assets. As currency
diversification affects directly the total converted value of assets, it changes banks’ debt
capacity and their resilience to economic shocks. Thereby, currency diversification of
assets should affect leverage responsiveness to the value of assets, namely the leverage
procyclicality. Using innovative data on credit institutions located in France between
1999 and 2014, we examine whether US dollar diversification of assets is pertinent for
the analysis of leverage procyclicality. Focusing on investment banks, our results suggest
that the net effect of US dollar diversification is dominated by the valuation effect. After
extracting the valuation effect of diversification, it also posits the importance of two op-
posite effects in leverage procyclicality. Additionally, our results confirms the theoretical
prediction where currency mismatch does not affect leverage procyclicality. Implicitly
it supports the idea that leverage procyclicality is only driven by assets. Finally, our
conclusions support the idea that US dollar diversification is relevant to the analysis of
leverage procyclicality especially for the post crisis period.
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1 Introduction
The traditional models of financial accelerator from Bernanke and Gertler [1989], Kiy-
otaki and Moore [1997] posit that the procyclicality of asset prices amplifies booms and
burst in financial cycle. During a boom asset prices increase which implies a strength-
ening of the banks’ collateral value. Therefore, banks use their additional debt capacity
to finance new credit. The ensuing credit expansion fuels cyclical upturn.
Recently, the financial crisis has redrawn researchers’ attention on financial accelera-
tor and more precisely on leverage procyclicality. The link between financial accelerator
and leverage procyclicality is straightforward. During booms, asset prices increase and
- for a given value of debt - it lowers leverage. If banks have a target leverage ratio,
they would increase their debt in order to restore initial leverage. A procyclical leverage
is then defined when banks do not target a constant leverage and take fully advantage
of the increased asset prices. As posited by Adrian and Shin [2014], the dynamic of
leverage is then only constrained by the Value at Risk rule. During booms banks extend
their debts in order to keep their probability of default constant. [Adrian et al., 2012]
show that leverage procyclicality also induces an endogenous mechanism similar to the
financial accelerator.
Empirically, [Adrian and Shin, 2010] confirm the major five US investment banks’
leverage procyclicality between 1997 and 2008. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2011] extend the
analysis to large US and European banks. Although they do not distinguish investment
banks from commercial banks, they confirm leverage procyclicality for either banks in
the US or banks in Europe. Focusing on European banks Baglioni et al. [2013] ex-
tract investment banks from the total ”universal bank” sample. They find that these
investment banks show similar procyclical adjustment than US banks. Considering the
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universal bank model of European banks their conclusions posit a leverage that is more
procyclical than to their US counterpart. Finally, looking at Canadian banks Damar
et al. [2013] also confirm a procyclical leverage of this institutions.
Although Angelini et al. [2009] provide a well detailed analysis on the sources of fi-
nancial procyclicality, they do not include the potential impact of total asset’s currency
diversification. Theoretically, a bank’s balance sheet is expressed in domestic currency
thereby implying a converting process for assets initially denominated in foreign cur-
rency. Thus, bank’s total collateral is also affected by this conversion. Additionally to
the diversification on credit risk, currency diversification introduces an exchange rate
channel - known as the valuation effect - on the dynamic of total assets. Following
Pedrono [2015], the net effect of asset currency diversification is thus composed of two
opposite effects. First, it implies a credit risk diversification which should reduce lever-
age procyclicality if the foreign asset is not perfectly correlated. Second, the valuation
effect strengthens leverage procyclicality by promoting in the portfolio the asset that
offers higher returns.
As highlighted by Borio and Disyatat [2011], Baba et al. [2009], McGuire and Von Pe-
ter [2012], European banks were largely involved in US money markets before 2008. This
international development induces some degree of currency diversification of both assets
and liabilities. Focusing on banks located in France, the average share of total assets
denominated in foreign currency was around 0.3 in 2000. Despite the introduction and
the development of the euro area, US dollar diversification remains significant with an
average of 0.17 over the period 1999-2014.
Besides the recent renewed interest of academic literature in banking leverage issues,
financial regulators have also been more and more focused on this topic over the past
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few years. In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced a
leverage ratio as a key component of the Basel III framework.2 In the European Union,
the leverage ratio requirement is still under review by the European Commission. There-
fore, knowing that financial regulators are paying closer and closer attention to banking
leverage, we believe that shedding light on the relations between currency diversification
and leverage characteristics can also be of major interest for banking supervisors.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to develop an empirical analysis on the link be-
tween leverage procyclicality of bank and US dollar diversification of assets. To do that,
we use innovative micro data on credit institutions located in French between 1999 and
2014. Following Baglioni et al. [2013] we also extract investment banks from total uni-
versal banks.
This paper implies two main contributions. First, it fills the gap in the current empir-
ical literature which does not include currency diversification in the analysis of leverage
procyclicality. Second, we provide wide descriptive statistics on foreign currency expo-
sure.
Our results confirm the presence of leverage procyclicality for banks located in France
between 1999 and 2014. Regarding US dollar diversification and investment banks, our
results suggest that the net effect of US dollar diversification is dominated by the valua-
tion effect. Thereby, US dollar diversification increases leverage responsiveness to assets.
By extracting the valuation effect of diversification, we show that it affects significantly
investment banks’ leverage procyclicality. It demonstrates the importance of the two
opposite effects within the net effect. Additionally, our results confirm the theoretical
2In this paper, we define banking leverage as the ratio of assets divided by equity. In the regulatory
perspective, the reverse is more frequently used: leverage ratio divides a capital measure by an exposure
measure. Therefore, setting a minimum requirement to leverage ratio is strictly equivalent to setting a
maximum on banking leverage. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
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prediction where currency mismatch does not affect leverage procyclicality. Implicitly it
supports the idea that procyclical leverage is only driven by assets. Finally, our conclu-
sions support the idea that US dollar diversification is relevant to the overall analysis
especially for the post crisis period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simplified
theoretical framework based on Adrian and Shin [2010]. Section 3 describes the data set
and provides details on the sample selection. Section 4 supplies descriptive statistics on
currency diversification. We explain in section 5 our empirical approach while results
are summarized in section 6.
2 Theory on leverage procyclicality
Following Adrian and Shin [2010, 2014], leverage procyclicality is derived from the defini-
tion of the Value at Risk (VaR) and the fact that banks are dynamic in the management
of their balance sheets. Considering a random variable A for the value of assets at a
given horizon, the VaR can be defined as the maximum loss V of asset value A0 with
given probability. Formally, the banks Value-at-Risk at confidence level c relative to
some base level A0 is smallest non-negative number V such that:
Prob(A ≤ A0 − V ) ≤ 1− c (1)
Then, the VaR rule stipulates that banks maintain a sufficient amount of equity E to
cover potential loss V such that:
E = V (2)
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To be solvent, bank adjusts its exposure when the situation is more risky. Thereby, bank
brings its VaR back in line with its equity.
Bank’s leverage λ is defined as a ratio of total assets over equity such that:
λ =
A
E
=
A
V
=
1
v
(3)
where : v =
V
A
Where v is the unit VaR that we can interpret as a risk premium. As demonstrated in
Adrian and Shin [2010, 2014], v is counter-cyclical. It means that leverage goes posi-
tively with total assets.
Introducing currency diversification changes the definition of total assets. Denote A
the domestic asset in domestic currency and A? the foreign asset in foreign currency.
Thereby, total assets expressed in domestic currency is the sum of A and SA? where S
is the exchange rate. Leverage becomes:
λ =
A+ SA?
E
=
A+ SA?
V
=
1
v
(4)
where : v =
V
A+ SA?
Adding a foreign asset changes the definition of the risk premium which now depends
on both assets expressed in domestic currency. It follows that leverage is still positively
related to total assets but this relationship depends on the degree of currency diversifica-
tion. If both assets are positively correlated but not completely, and if the exchange rate
regime is fixed, the introduction of a second asset diversifies the credit risk. Leverage
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procyclicality is thereby reduced.
Consider a floating exchange rate regime with a cyclical domestic currency as euro
is supposed to be. Following Pedrono [2015], floating exchange rate implies additional
space capacity on banks balance sheets through a valuation effect. As balance sheets are
expressed in domestic currency, the converting process affects the weight of assets within
the bank’s portfolio. Under these assumptions, a floating regime implies a growing share
of the asset that offers higher returns. Space capacity on banks’ balance sheets is thereby
going up. Compared to fixed exchange rate, it increases procyclicality. However, it re-
sults from the combination of the two effects a decrease in leverage procyclicality.
Following this literature, currency diversification is challenging leverage procyclical-
ity through its impact on total assets. Our main focus should be on the interaction term
between total assets and currency diversification.
Additionally, the theoretical results suggest that currency mismatch is irrelevant for
leverage procyclicality. As leverage is driven by the composition of assets, currency
diversification of liability does not affect the relationship. This empirical analysis is a
great opportunity to verify whether currency mismatch is pertinent.
3 Data set and sample selection
Our sample consists of french and foreign credit institutions located in France. Data are
collected by the french banking supervision authority known as the ACPR. Data are on
a yearly basis from 1999 to 2014. Because of bankruptcies, sample selection and merger
acquisitions, our panel is unbalanced. We have a total of 529 observations over the period
with a minimum of 21 observations in 2013 and a maximum of 43 observations in 2006.
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The decline in observations since 2006 can be partly explained by the concentration of
the french banking system.
A first sample selection is directly applied within the request conditions of the data.
Thus, our data concern all institutions that are subject to the monetary statistic.3 For
the other institutions, there is a selection on the total amount in foreign currency of
their balance sheets: institutions with less than 800 million euros in foreign currency are
excluded to the sample.
We add two other sample selections to built sub-samples. First, we keep credit insti-
tutions which have a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period. Second, we identify
investment banks by following the methodology of Baglioni et al. [2013] except that we
focus on the type of liabilities the bank uses. Thus, a credit institution is identified as
an investment bank if its average ratio of deposit to total debt is lower than the median
value of the total sample over the period.
The final data set brings together two types of data. First, we focus on classical ac-
counting data. Those data can be collected at a different level of consolidation depending
on the credit institution. For large and international institutions, data are consolidated
using the IFRS accounting standards. Smaller parent institutions provide consolidated
data and use french accounting standards (FRGAAP). Finally, stand-alone institutions
provide unconsolidated data. With years, consolidated data becomes more and more
dominant. In 2014, all the data are consolidated. As the three different levels of consol-
idation may imply different rules and definitions of the balance sheet components, we
control for it in our analysis.
3It includes all institutions that are large enough to be under the scope of the ECB for the monetary
policy.
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The second type of data includes foreign currency exposures. On the asset side, we
get the currency breakdown of credits and debt securities, while the liability is composed
of total deposits and debt issued. The currency breakdown is given for 5 major curren-
cies known as the euro, the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and the Pound
sterling.4 As data are expressed in euro, the exchange rate channel is already included
in the final degree of currency diversification.
Exposures in currencies are unconsolidated. As our interest is on the global analysis
of banking groups, we need to build a proxy of consolidated diversification. The solution
we choose consists in adding up currency exposures of all affiliates in the same banking
group. Thereby, currency diversification of a banking group is measured through a ratio
of total amount denominated in a given currency relative to the total amount in all
currencies.
This measure may have two issues. First, there is a risk of a double counting because
of intra-group flows. However, as long as diversification is a ratio, the double counting
issue appears in both the numerator and the denominator. It mitigates the risk. Second,
unconsolidated data do not include exposures of affiliates abroad. Thus, this measure
of currency diversification might underestimate the true degree of diversification of a
banking group.
An alternative of this measure of currency diversification consists in keeping the
exposures of the head of the group only. However, this alternative shows really thin
differences with our measure, except for cooperative banking groups. As cooperative
banking groups are more decentralized, we believe that our measure better captures the
overall currency diversification of these groups.
4The Pound sterling is only available since 2003. Before 2003, it was included in the ”other” category.
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4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 provides the foreign currency breakdown of assets and liabilities over the past
fifteen years. For both sides of balance sheet, we observe a growing trend of activities
denominated in foreign currencies as developed in Borio and Disyatat [2011], Baba et al.
[2009], McGuire and Von Peter [2012]. Despite this global progression, two main shocks
are observable. The financial crisis and the US dollar shortage stand out with the slow-
down of 2008 and the decline of 2009, while the disturbances due to the euro area debt
crisis show up in 2011 and 2012.
(a) Asset (b) Liability
Figure 1: Currency breakdown of foreign currency exposures
With no surprise, the US dollar is the first foreign currency for both assets and li-
abilities. Another currency also emerges from figure 1 especially in the recent years,
the Japanese yen. As observed in McGuire and Von Peter [2012], the Japanese yen has
always been part of the foreign assets and liabilities for the past twenty years. However,
before the financial crisis European banks were also highly dependent on US money mar-
kets even for non US areas like Asian countries thereby creating an asymmetry in their
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balance sheets. In the recent years, Japanese yen gains weight which might translate an
adjustable strategy from European banks. It becomes the second foreign currency for
assets in 2011 2013 and 2014 as illustrated in figure 1)a, and it is the second foreign fund-
ing currency in 2014 as illustrated in in figure 1)b. This recent evolution of the Japanese
yen is also generalized worldwide. Between 2010 and 2013, Japanese yen has known the
most important jump in trading activity according to BIS-Survey [2013].5 The confirm-
ing recovery of banking activity in 2014 highlighted in BIS-Quarterly-Review [March
2015] has probably contributed to the 2014 yen boom in France. Among the advanced
economies, the revival of cross-border bank lending to Japan stands out with a annual
percentage changes larger than 15% for the second half of 2014. Additionally, between
the end of 2010 and the end of 2014, the annual percentage changes of cross-border
claims in Japanese yen was positive while the US dollar fluctuated between positive
and negative percentage rates. Finally, the combination of large cross-border claims to
Japan and accommodating monetary policy in Japan may have encourage french banks’
funding in Japanese yen in 2014 as observed in figure 1)b.
Figure 1 also highlights a potential currency mismatch between assets and liabilities
with a dominance of the latter.6 Focusing on US dollar exposures, figure 2)a. confirms
the currency mismatch by plotting the difference between assets and liabilities denomi-
nated in US dollar for each banks. Despite the heterogeneity between credit institutions,
the pre-crisis period is characterized by a growing US dollar currency mismatch which
confirms the balance sheet asymmetry. In McGuire and Von Peter [2012], we find also
negative foreign positions in US dollar in several periods before 2009.7 In both analysis,
5Since the last survey in 2010, trading in Japanese yen increased by 63% and the turnover in the
USD/JPY pair rose by 70% in this period. As a result, the yen expended its worldwide share in FX
trading by 4%.
6These results might seem different to McGuire and Von Peter [2012] - where net foreign positions
for French banks is positive - but it is not. We are looking at the positions in foreign currency where
euro is excluded while it is included in their definition of all currencies net positions.
7Especially for 2001-2002Q2, 2003Q2-2003Q3, 2004Q4, 2005Q4, and 2008. However, they focus on
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the crisis seems to have a readjustment effect where currency mismatches reduces since
2007.
(a) Currency mismatch (b) Mismatch and distributions (1999-2014)
Figure 2: Currency mismatch
Theoretically, currency mismatch is not supposed to affect leverage procyclicality.
However, we include this dimension in our analysis in order to see whether it is relevant
or not. We identify with a dummy credit institutions that have a positive mismatch
with higher assets in foreign currency and credit institutions with a negative currency
mismatch. With such a distinction, we might think that the dummy would capture the
degree of currency diversification of assets but it is not. Figure 2)b. plots the currency
diversification of assets for the two types of credit institutions. As both distributions
include high degree of currency diversification and similar shape, the introduction of the
mismatch position might not diminish the effect of diversification in regressions.
Currency diversification implies two effects on total assets. First it introduces a
diversification in credit risk if assets are sufficiently different. Second it induces a val-
net foreign positions while we focus on net positions including domestic and foreign positions.
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uation effect due to conversion. Figure 3) illustrates the contribution of pure valuation
effect in US dollar diversification. Share of assets denominated in US dollar with euro
area counterparty should not imply a credit risk diversification while shares relative to
non-residents induce both effects for reporting banks. Following the red bars, the pure
valuation effect due to currency diversification had increased between 2000 and 2007.
After the crisis, US dollar diversification mainly concerns non-resident counterparty.
Figure 3: Currency diversification of assets: Resident includes all euro area counterparty
while ”N-Resident” excludes euro area counterparty. Bars are for average shares of assets in
USD related to each counterparty. Only banks that have a US dollar diversification are included
in this graph.
Finally, table 1 presents summary statistics for ∆Leverage and ∆Asset respectively
the annual growth rate of leverage and the annual growth rate of assets. Diver is the US
dollar currency diversification and US dollar diversification with resident counterparty is
defined through Diver RES.8 The standard deviation, minimum and maximum confirm
the presence of heterogeneity in our sample.
8The complete definitions of variables are provided in the appendix.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
These summary statistics are for the complete sample over the period 1999-2014. This table
presents variable averages, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. Variable definitions are
provided in the appendix.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Leverage 16.04 12.67 1.14 78.68 529
∆Leverage -0.02 0.25 -1.43 1.19 444
∆Asset 0.03 0.22 -1.6 1.1 444
Diver 0.17 0.2 0 0.84 529
Diver RES 0.05 0.09 0 0.67 529
5 Empirical specification
Adrian and Shin [2008] develop an error correction model which links changes in leverage
with changes in asset value, thereby confirming the procyclicality of leverage. By show-
ing a strong and positive relationship, they demonstrate that financial intermediaries
adjust their balance sheets actively. In their model, the dependent variable is the log
difference of leverage ∆Leverage and the variable of interest is the log difference of total
assets ∆Asset. Thanks to this specification they also highlight that leverage is a mean
reverting process with a negative relationship between the dependent variable and the
lagged value of leverage in log.
As explained in section 2 currency diversification should challenge leverage procycli-
cality through its impact on total assets. We introduce in this model an interaction
variable between changes in assets and US dollar diversification at the previous period
thereby capturing the impact of the initial currency diversification. We add Divers
which measures the degree of US dollar diversification at the previous period. Divers
is part of the control variables as our interest is really on the interaction term.9 The
9Our variable of interest is constructed by interacting an exogenous term Divers with the potentially
endogenous variable ∆Asset. As we control for the effect of the endogenous variable, our interaction
term can be interpreted as exogenous (Angrist and Krueger [1999]). See also Bun and Harrison [2014]
for a related discussion.
13
complete specification is of the form:
∆Leveragei,t = α+ β1 ln (Leveragei,t−1) + β2 ∆Asseti,t
+ β3 (∆Asseti,t x Diversi,t−1) + β4 Diversi,t−1
+ δ Controls+ γFEtime + ui,t (PRO)
Where ∆ represents the difference between t and t − 1. We introduced three control
variables in Controls in addition to Diver. First, we define a ratio of total off-balance
to total assets and we keep the log-difference of it. This variable would control for hedging
strategy. Second, we use a dummy Conso which is equal to 1 if the data are consolidated.
Finally, we introduce another dummy IFRS which is equal to 1 if credit institutions
are under the IFRS accounting standards. These two dummies control for the different
sources we have explained in section 2. They are also taken in difference. As we want
to see whether the mismatch position is relevant or not for leverage procyclicality, we
introduce in some specifications a dummy Mismatch which is equal to 1 if total assets
denominated in foreign currency are higher than total liabilities denominated in foreign
currency. Finally, we control time fixed effect in order to capture crisis and changes in
regulation. ui,t is the term of error.
6 Empirical findings
6.1 A global vision from 1999 to 2014:
Table 4 reproduces similar results as in Adrian and Shin [2008]. With a negative and
significant coefficient for all specifications, we can confirm the mean reverting process of
leverage. All coefficients relative to the growth rate of assets are positive and significant
thereby confirming leverage procyclicality. The largest level of leverage procyclicality is
observed when we focus on investment banks with repeated occurrences as in column
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(2+3).
Our main variable of interest known as the interaction variable between the growth
rate of assets and the lagged US dollar diversification is positive for all samples and has
a significant coefficient for investment banks. These first results goes against the theory
prediction at least for the investment banks in (3). Theoretically, the valuation effect
is supposed to be dominated by the effect of credit risk diversification. The absence of
significance may illustrate this two opposite effects in (1), (2) and (2+3), while valuation
effect seems to dominate in (3).
Table 5 goes further on the two different channels of currency diversification. Our
previous measure of US dollar diversification does not allow us to distinguish between
the credit risk diversification and the valuation effect due to exchange rate fluctuation.
Instead of using the total US dollar diversification of assets, we might use the US dol-
lar diversification of assets with domestic counterparty Divers RES to capture the pure
valuation effect. As assets are linked to resident only, this new measure removes the
risk credit diversification. Table 5 reports the results with the variable Divers RES. Our
main variable of interest - the interaction term between the growth rate of assets and
the US dollar diversification - is positive and significant for all investment banks and
investment banks with at least five years occurrence. These results confirm the presence
of a valuation effect of US dollar diversification on leverage through the dynamic of total
assets. Compared to results from table 4 where the coefficient of the interaction term
is equal to 0.56 for investment banks, coefficient grows to 2.86 when diversification only
induces domestic counterparty. Therefore, our results confirm the presence of two op-
posite effects within US dollar diversification. There is a positive valuation effect and a
negative credit risk diversification effect. Our results support the theoretical conclusions
of Pedrono [2015].
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Banking leverage is supposed to be driven by the dynamic of assets, thereby putting
liabilities aside. As demonstrated in theory, a currency mismatch should not affect lever-
age procyclicality. We introduce in table 6 the mismatch position in order to check this
assumption. Coefficients are not significant for all samples and this additional variable
does not increases the adjusted R2 compared to the previous table. This result is in
line with the theoretical conclusion. As leverage is mainly driven by collateral, currency
mismatch which induces the liability of banks should not affect leverage procyclicality.
6.2 A two periods decomposition:
Our analysis is over a long period from 1999 to 2014. It includes two main sub-periods.
On the one hand, from 1999 to 2007 the euro has been lunched and developed. This first
sub-period has been characterized by growing enthusiasm around the unique currency
and its potential as a leading international currency. It is also associated with large
leveraging and a continuous appreciation of the euro from the end of 2000. On the other
hand, from 2008 to 2014 the euro area financial system has been hit by several shocks
such as the propagation of the subprime crisis in 2008, the banking crisis, the Greek debt
crisis in 2011 and the different threats of euro area exit since then. Additionally, the
second sub-period is also characterized by a renewal of regulation and a deleveraging.
Therefore, the two sub-periods decomposition allows us to see whether the relationship
is symmetric or not.
Table 7 decomposes the 1999-2014 period into two sub-periods known as 1999-2007
and 2008-2014 for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period respectively. Despite the lack
of significance for the mean reverting process in the post-crisis sub-period, results from
Adrian and Shin [2008] are still valid and there is no complete reversal of the situation
between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis sub-period.
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Conversely, the role played by US dollar diversification of assets seems to be more
specific to sub-periods. Regarding our main variable of interest the interaction term,
our results suggest that the post-crisis sub-period is much more relevant for the impact
of currency diversification. Coefficients are positive and significant for all samples.
This difference between the two sub-periods may come from the dynamic of the
exchange rate euro-dollar. The pre-crisis period is characterized by a long-term appre-
ciation of the euro while the post-crisis sub-period is subject to financial distress with
sharp exchange rate fluctuations and zero bound monetary policy. Considering this envi-
ronment, the valuation effect of US dollar diversification clearly dominates the credit risk
diversification in our analysis. Thereby, US dollar diversification may have magnified
leverage responsiveness to total assets.
6.3 Additional findings
This section adds several results from different specifications we think interesting to
study. Instead of looking at the US dollar currency diversification, we focus on the total
foreign currency diversification in order to capture the complete currency diversification.
Coefficients and significance of variables linked to diversification decrease. As this vari-
able captures different currencies it may induces several exchange rate fluctuations which
may play an opposite role. The US dollar diversification is in this sens more precise.
An alternative to the current accounting definition of leverage is the Basel III def-
inition which replaces equity by TIER1 and adds the off balance sheet to total assets.
With this new definition, leverage is less procyclical or even no procyclical. Our results
are in line with previous literature.
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The dummy Mismatch is quite limited in its definition because it does not capture
the size of the mismatch. An alternative is to define a ratio of the currency mismatch
over total assets. However, this new measurement definitely captures the degree of cur-
rency diversification of assets.
Finally, it might be interesting to underline the fact that off-balance sheet ratio is not
irrelevant to the leverage analysis even though we introduce currency diversification. Our
results suggest that currency diversification has to be included in banking monitoring
even if banks have hedging strategies.
Conclusion
Using an innovative data set on credit institutions located in France between 1999 and
2014 enables us to examine whether currency diversification is relevant for leverage pro-
cyclicality. Theoretically, as currency diversification of assets affects directly the total
value of assets, it changes their debt capacity and the procyclicality of their leverage.
This paper implies two main contributions. First, it fills the gap in the empirical
literature which does not include currency diversification in the determinants of leverage.
Second, we provide interesting descriptive statistics on foreign currency exposures.
Our results confirm previous conclusions on leverage procyclicality. Furthermore, it
suggests that US dollar diversification is relevant to the analysis of the leverage procycli-
cality of investment banks . It posits the domination valuation effect over the credit di-
versification effect. Therefore, US dollar diversification increases leverage responsiveness
to assets. Additionally, our results confirms the theoretical prediction where currency
mismatch does not affect leverage. Implicitly it supports the idea that leverage is only
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driven by the asset of banks.
Considering all samples we look at, the effect of US dollar diversification depends on
the type of banks and the sub-period decomposition. US dollar diversification expresses
itself more easily within investment banks. Regarding the crisis decomposition, our re-
sults suggest that the post-crisis period is more relevant for capturing the impact of US
dollar diversification on leverage procyclicality.
Finally, our analysis is based on the idea that banks do not target a constant leverage.
However, the new Basel III regulation would impose in the near future a new leverage
ratio which aims at limiting leverage procyclicality. Thus, we might turn our interests on
the effect of currency diversification on the bank’s stability when leverage is exogenous.
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7 Appendix
.1 Variable definitions
Table 2: Variable definitions
Main variables:
Leverage AssetsEquity
∆ Leverage Growth rate of leverage
∆ Asset Growth rate of assets
Divers Assets denominated in USDTotalAssets
Divers RES Assets denominated in USD with resident conterpartyTotalAssets
Invest. =1 if
(
Deposits
Total Debts
)
i
<
(
Deposits
Total Debts
)
median(i...N)
Mismatch =1 if Assets in foreign currency > Liabilities in foreign currency
Controls:
FR =1 if banks are french
Sub Cat. Breakdown credit institutions between banks, cooperative banking groups
and other
Conso =1 if data are consolidated
∆Conso Changes in Conso
IFRS =1 if banks report data using IFRS standards
∆IFRS Changes in IFRS
Off BS Off−balance sheetAssets
∆Off BS growth rate of Off BS
22
.2 Correlation
Table 3: Variance co-variance matrix (1999-2014)
∆Leverage ∆Asset Diver. Diver RES Invest. Mismatch
∆Leverage 1
444
∆Asset 0.6229* 1
0
444 444
Divers -0.0361 -0.0681 1
0.4477 0.1518 0
444 444 529
Divers RES 0.0643 0.0095 0.6160* 1
0.1764 0.841 0
444 444 529 529
Invest. 0.0301 0.0258 0.2840* 0.2394* 1
0.5266 0.588 0 0
444 444 529 529 529
Mismatch -0.0148 -0.1131* 0.0728 0.0317 -0.0322 1
0.7552 0.0171 0.0942 0.4673 0.4601
444 444 529 529 529 529
.3 Empirical results
.3.1 Leverage Procyclicality
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Table 4: Procyclical leverage and US dollar diversification
Dependent variable : ∆Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
ln (Leveraget−1) -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆Assett 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.72*** 0.86***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
∆Assett x Diverst−1 0.04 0.07 0.56* 0.58
(0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.42)
Diverst−1 -0.10 -0.14 -0.02 -0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
∆conso -0.04 -0.03 -0.16* -0.15
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
∆Off BS -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆IFRS 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Constant 0.12** 0.15** 0.15** 0.20**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.63
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks and
banks’ nationality. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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Table 5: Procyclical leverage, US dollar diversification and pure valuation effect
Dependent variable : ∆Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
ln (Leveraget−1) -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆Assett 0.74*** 0.80*** 0.67*** 0.81***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
∆Assett x Divers RESt−1 -0.01 -0.02 2.86*** 2.85***
(1.10) (1.17) (0.82) (0.78)
Divers RESt−1 -0.25 -0.27 0.09 -0.08
(0.28) (0.31) (0.27) (0.25)
∆conso -0.03 -0.01 -0.16** -0.16*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
∆Off BS -0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆IFRS 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Constant 0.07** 0.07* 0.14** 0.17**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.49 0.57 0.64
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks and
banks’ nationality. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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Table 6: Procyclical leverage, US dollar diversification and currency mismatch position
Dependent variable : ∆Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
ln (Leveraget−1) -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆Assett 0.73*** 0.80*** 0.70*** 0.85***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
∆Assett x Diverst−1 0.06 0.08 0.59* 0.61
(0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.41)
Diverst−1 -0.10 -0.14 -0.02 -0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Mismatcht−1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆conso -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
∆Off BS -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆IFRS 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
cons 0.14** 0.14** 0.17** 0.21***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.63
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks and
banks’ nationality. Time Fixed-Effects included.
26
Table 7: Procyclical leverage, US dollar diversification and crisis decomposition
Dependent variable : ∆Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
ln (Leveraget−1) -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Post-crisis x ln (Leveraget−1) -0.01 -0.02 -0.04** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆Assett 0.71*** 0.80*** 0.70*** 0.83***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Post-crisis x ∆Assett 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.90***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
∆Assett x Diverst−1 -0.04 -0.14 0.69* 0.92
(0.33) (0.40) (0.36) (0.61)
Post-crisis (∆Assett x Diverst−1) 0.52*** 0.62*** 0.48** 0.37*
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Diverst−1 -0.11 -0.14 0.12 0.00
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
Post-crisis x Diverst−1 -0.09 -0.13* -0.16 -0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14)
Post-crisis dummy -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant 0.11* 0.12* 0.11 0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.62
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks and
banks’ nationality. The table decomposes each coefficient relative to two sub-periods:
the pre-crisis period from 1999 to 2007 and the post-crisis period from 2008 to 2014.
Not all control variables shown. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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